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ABSTRACT 
This research consists of a wide literature review on deregulation and privatisation of 
airline business world wide. The emphasis is on the benefits of airline privatisation. The 
idea was to attempt to find out whether the deregulation of South African Airways (SAA) 
indeed brought about the changes that are expected of a commercial concern. These 
changes included cost cutting strategies and charging economically efficient fares as well 
as abandoning unprofitable routes. 
Some personal contact with the SAA Public Relations Officers in Cape Town and 
Johannesburg was used to gather the data used in the research. The Transnet and the 
Competition Board annual reports were other major sources of data. The analysis was 
accomplished by scrutinising the SAA financial statements as to whether SAA followed 
all the requirements implemented when deregulation was introduced. An econrnetric test 
was used to check whether there was any improvement in capacity utilisation at SAA as 
was expected to happen after deregulation. 
The findings from this research are that SAA did introduce new measures to try to be 
profitable and cut costs, such as, reducing the labour force and abandoning unprofitable 
routes. SAA also stopped cross-subsidisation practise, whereby loss making routes were 
financed by profitable ones. In general SAA introduced measures that can be expected 
from a profit maximising firm which is under pressure to tum profits. However, these 
changes have not yet produced consistent results as far as profit is concerned and is 
supported by the econometrics test which does not support the expected hypothesis that 
since SAA is now operated on commercial basis, should be able to tum profits and be 
efficient. 
\ Although profit alone might not be an efficient measure of the performance of SAA given 
~hat airline business is highly de endent on the economic c cle, there is an element of 
hindrance to the general performance of SAA in the continued association of SAA and 
Transnet. This association does not give SAA much leeway to structure its balance sheet 
the way it wants it or deems more profitable. Thus, it could be said that, there is an 
INTRODUCTION 
Privatisation has become a central feature of the economic policies of a variety of 
nations regardless of whether they are developed or developing. The private sector is 
sought after for its disciplines in corporate governance, which is seen to be a catalyst 
for economic growth. Privatisation embraces denationalisation or selling of state 
owned assets, deregulation or liberalisation and competitive tendering as well as the 
introduction of private ownership and market arrangements where they do not exist. 
Privatisation policy is normally associated with various objectives, some of which are 
in conflict. In all the cases, consumers are expected to benefit from the introduction of 
market forces reflected in the profit motive, rivalry, more choice, greater efficiency 
and innovation. In certain cases, the policy aims to reduce both the size of the public 
sector through denationalisation and public sector b~rrowing. A conflict might arise 
when the selling of the public asset is not compatible with the goal of efficiency, such 
as transferring monopoly power from the state to the private sector with out 
increasing competition and rivalry. 
The privatisation debate in South Africa has been an ongoing affair, and it intensified 
after the election of the new government in 1994. This was in some part attributed to 
the need to restructure the publie sector and at the same time redistribute wealth to the 
previously disadvantaged South Africans. It was realised that there were too many 
regulatory limitations on economic activities in South Africa, and for job creation and 
growth of the economy the private sector had a key role to play in the economy as a 
whole. 
Thus the purpose of this paper is to make a contextual analysis of the above with 
South African Airw~s (SAA). The main aim is to determine whether SAA was 
indeed inefficient before deregulation and whether its operations improved after · 
deregulation. The motive for this is to determine whether SAA has restructured 
enough to privatise. It should be noted that state-owned firms should be restructured 
before sale by introducing reforms that are reasonably feasjble and that enhance 
efficiency and profitability. This will make the value of the firm more visible to the 
private sector and also raise the bargaining power of the seller as it will be easier to 
hold out for a higher price when a firm is commercially viable. This point is important 
because for the state to gain support on privatisation from the public, it should not be 
seen to be disposing off state assets at give away prices. 
The biggest constraint in the research has been the lack of adequate and relevant data 
available on SAA. The problem is that since SAA belongs to the Transnet group, it 
does not prepare or compile its own statistical data which would have made matters 
easier in this research. The difficult task of using the Transnet annual reports is that 
they only report consolidated results of the group. This made the analysis complex, in 
that, it was not possible to make a separate analysis of international, regional or 
domestic operations of SAA. Thus, the arguments here might be a little biased 
towards domestic operations, since the authorities have more power to influence 
changes domestically as opposed to regionally and internationally. 
The research methodology used in this paper has been such that the arguments 
presented, are a result of an extensive literature review on the deregulation and 
privatisation of airline industries world-wide. Personal, E-mail and telephonic 
contacts have been made with the relevant people at SAA. 
The paper has been structured as follows : Chapter one discusses a general overview 
of how the state became involved in the provision of goods and services, and also the 
short comings of the state ' s involvement in the market. This chapter also argues for 
the introduction of a market economy and that is where the benefits of privatisation 
comes in. Privatisation is advocated to be the best solution to problems of government 
failure and inefficiency. 
Chapter two focuses on the economics of airline industries. This basically puts into 
perspective the complexity with which airline operations are involved. The historical 
background of aviation in South Africa is also discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter three discusses the performance of SAA before iind after deregulation. An 
effort is made to try to compare SAA's profitability before deregulation and after 
deregulation. This is done by looking at the improvements SAA engaged in after 
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deregulation which were intended to improve its efficiency and profits as well as the 
strategies it used before deregulation which could be said were not profit oriented. 
Some reference is also made in this chapter to deregulation of airline industries 
elsewhere as a yard stick to find out whether SAA is on the right track. 
Chapter four is a mini one which tries to determine whether indeed what is expected 
of deregulation was achieved, such as cost reduction and improvement in capacity 
utilisation. An econometrics test was employed to test whether there was an 
improvement in capacity utilisation. 
Chapter five dis cusses th; recommendations based on what transpired in chapters 
three and four. The bottom line is that SAA has restructure,d enough and the 
recommendation is that it is ready to be privatised. Commercialisation alone is not 
suitable because the involvement of the state in the operations of SAA would make 
the competition field uneven (free market forces would be hindered). The gradual 
approach of strategic p" nership is the method recommended for SAA' s privatisation 
because of its advantages given the complev:ity of airline business. Chapter six gives 
I 
the conclusion and su~y of the whole paper. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.0 From Plan to Market 
The current era is of tight government budgets and popular discontent with public 
services. These make governments all over the world look to the private sector for 
ideas about how to manage government organisations for greater efficiency and 
effectiveness ( Goldsmith, 1997). In some cases the government solicits ideas from 
the private sector ( commercialisation), while in others it sells state owned enterprises 
to the private sector either as a whole or partly. 
Privatisation therefore becomes the relegation of the provision of public goods to the 
private sector. It is a move from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. 
Different countries have undertaken privatisation for various reasons and thus at 
different speed. The main reason for privatisation which can be said to be univ~rsal to 
both the developed and developing world is that it is intended to diminish or even 
eliminate the burden of the state owned enterprises on the state' s finances by 
improving economic performance (Deme, 1997). In some countries such as Zambia 
and Mexico, they had huge public debt which they could not finance any longer. 
Therefore, they had to adhere to the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) conditions 
of the structural adjustment programmes for them to be considered for any further 
financial assistance. These meant that they had to restructure their public sector 
drastically, by either selling them to the private sector or liquidating non viable ones. 
1.2 Role of the State 
The centrally planned economy goes back to the days of Karl Marx who believed that 
socialism was the best system. This stemmed from the believe that if the market is left 
alone only suboptimal equilibrium will be obtained. Market regulation was therefore 
seen as a corrective measure in the face of market failure or suboptimal equilibrium. 
Theodore (1991 :39) commented that "where markets tend to operate with an 
underdevelopment bias, it is almost axiomatic to say that intervention is necessary ". 
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On the other hand, the neo-classical theory postulates assumptions of perfect 
competition and perfect foresight. It is through competition that the equilibrium 
optimums can be obtained, resulting in a more efficient and improved distribution and 
allocation of resources. The implication of the neo-classical theory is that all 
economic agents behave rationally in a bid to maximise their utility or profit. Thus 
any disturbance in the system will be anticipated well before it occurs, leading to the 
economy adjusting automatically to a stable equilibrium (Black and Dollery, 1992). 
Therefore, the neo-classists believe the government should not be involved in the 
market as the economy can take care of itself (adjust instantaneously and be efficient). 
However in the real world people do not have perfect information, they usually 
operate under conditions of significant uncertainty. This might lead to the emergence 
of imperfect competition such as monopoly and oligopoly. There are also problems of 
public goods, externalities and merit goods under which the efficient equilibrium will 
not be reached. Under these circumstances there is a market failure which calls for 
government intervention to guide the economy to an efficient equilibrium solution. 
The involvement of the government in the market is well documented in public 
finance works. Musgrave (1989:Pl 7) stated three main reasons for government 
intervention as, 
• the need to ensure an efficient allocation of resources, 
• the need to stabilise the path of the economic progress and, 
• the need to distribute income and wealth equally. 
The government is required to perform the allocation function where the production 
of public goods is involved, because private enterprise cannot respond adequately in 
the absence of price signals or when the possibility of making profit is insignificant. 
The government will also be duty bound under this function to control the production 
of goods and services whose market prices may not truly reflect their social value, 
such as education and health care. 
The government is also required to stabilise the economy in terms of curbing inflation 
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and unemployment. This is directly related to the government's political and social 
objectives. The market economy can also cause problems related to fiscal and 
monetary policies, such as high inflation which might be bad for economic growth 
(lack of investment) and the government needs to redress that. 
The government is also needed to enforce a legal structure which will be functional to 
economic progress and encourage wealth accumulation, especially for the private 
sector to exist. An example of these will be property rights and contract laws. 
Figure 1 below is used to illustrate a market failure under monopoly. It is also worth 
noting that there are two types of monopoly which are, an artificial monopoly 
(operating in a market where perfect competition is technically feasible) and a natural 
monopoly which is technically not feasible to operate under perfect competition 
conditions. This is the case because the nature of the service provided does not allow 
space for competition or even if it does, one firm will find it impossible to continue 
the business due to loses it makes. Figure 1 only illustrates the difference between 
artificial monopoly and perfect competition, while natural monopoly will be handled 
elsewhere in the paper. 
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Figure 1 
Price 
Pm 
Pc 
Qm Qc Quantity 
Artificial monopoly may exist as a result of potential competitors being prevented 
from entering the market either by the government or the concerned firm ' s behaviour 
of setting price below its profit maximising level to prevent new firms from entering 
(Black and Dollery 1992). 
Under perfect competition, equilibrium occurs where the sum of the individual 
marginal cost curves (MC) are equal to market demand (D) for the commodity. This 
is given by point C in Figure 1. The corresponding price and quantity demanded are 
Pc and Qc respectively. In a monopolistic situation or market supplied by one firm 
only, the firm maximises its profit when its marginal cost equals marginal revenue 
(MR). If we assume the monopoly firm to have the same marginal cost and demand 
(same MC and D curves) as our competitive firm, then its profit maximisation point 
will be at M in Figure 1. The equilibrium price and quantity demanded will be Pm and 
Qm respectively. This reveals that a perfectly competitive industry will provide more 
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goods (Qc-Qm) at a lower price (Pc-Pm), while the monopolist provide fewer units of 
the good at a higher price. Thus the state intervention is justified in this case to try to 
provide more goods at a reasonable price. 
As mentioned earlier the government may also be needed to intervene in a situation of 
externalities. Externalities refers t@Jthe condition whereby the production of goods by 
one firm and consumption by one individual leads to others benefiting or suffering. 
An example of others suffering may be in the case of copper production, whereby the 
company benefits from profits while the society suffers from the sulphur dioxide 
emitted into the atmosphere. On the other hand an example of the society benefiting 
can be when an individual is inoculated against chicken-pox. Members benefit 
individually from this but the rest of the society also benefits 
indirectly from the disease not spreading to them. So the government is needed to 
force the copper producing firm to be responsible for the pollution it causes for the 
sake of the well being of the society as well as ensuring that the chicken-pox vaccine 
is available even though it is a rare disease. 
Figure 2 below is used to illustrate an eternality situation where society stands to 
benefit, such as health. 
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Figure 2 
Price MPC 
Pl 
P2 
MSB 
MPB=D 
i 
Ql Quantity 
The monopolist firm will be maximising profit where the marginal private cost (MPC) 
intersects with the marginal revenue curve (point Min figure 2). The price charged 
and quantity demanded will be Pl and Ql respectively. If there are external benefits 
in the provision of this service, it means it is under provided under private monopoly, 
and thus there is a need for the government to take over the provision. The relevant 
external benefits and costs are shown by the dotted lines of marginal social benefits 
(MSB) and marginal social costs (MSC) in Figure 2. It is important to note that the 
government when taking over the provision of this service is assumed to know the 
perceived social optimum provision of such a service. The perceived social optimum 
point is where MSB and MSC intersect, point T in figure 2. The private firm can 
never produce at this point because the average private cost (APC) exceeds the 
demand curve (MPB=D) which makes it the loss making area. Therefore, the state has 
to intervene by a subsidy to bring the price down to P2 and increase quantity to Q2 in 
Figure 2. The unit subsidy equal GS . Thus, Figure 2 reveals the government's ability 
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to increase output to the social optimum level, rendering its involvement in the 
market. 
Another notion of externality that could compel the state to be involved in the 
provision of a service is when consumers lack information about the existence of the 
same service elsewhere at a cheaper price. This could be due to budget constraints 
which confines the consumers to the little information they have. Therefore, the 
consumers end up only at a suboptimum equilibrium. In this case the state needs to 
centralise the information network so as to help consumers to easily obtain 
information about the existence of various services, and thus they can ~ttain optimum 
equilibrium. Externality problems can also exist when the private sector is reluctant to 
venture into the provision of goods and services due to risk involved or not being 
aware of the pecuniary internal and external economies of scale, such as the airline 
business. Therefore, the state is needed to take up the provision of such goods and 
s.ervices until the private sector is comfortable to take the provision. 
1.3 Why Privatise? 
Although the government's role in the market might seem solid and genuine, there is 
also a problem of government failure in its bid to correct the marke\ failure . This 
stems mainly from the principal-agent relationship under state-own~ enterprises as 
compared to their private counterparts. State-owned_.enterprises usually tend to have 
multiple objectives as opposed to the single one of profit maximisation allegedly 
-pursued by their private counterparts. An example here is that the state-owned 
enterprise ' s objective may include profitability while on the other hand they have to 
meet social objectives in terms of charging lower prices, and reducing unemployment. 
Therefore, state-owned enterprises are unnecessarily large and uncompetitive, as well 
as not being sensitive to the wants of the consumers. 
State-owned enterprises are also perceived to be ineff~ient due to direct competition 
from private firms often being excluded. Their funding is usually through the 
governme~t budget, and they can use the government ·as a guarantee when they have 
to acquire loans from outside the government (or country). The result is that the state-
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owned enterprises may have no bankruptcy constraint if government is always bailing 
them out. This in tum leads to the government' s borrowing requirements bulging to 
unmanageable levels at times. These usually leads to adverse effects of high deficits 
and taxes. 
Another point of nationalisation was to facilitate cross-subsidies from more profitable 
services. The motive for this is that cross-subsidisation of uneconomic services keeps 
alive the possibility of choice for some economically depressed areas. The end result 
is that cross-subsidisation entails restrictions on competition so as to protect the 
source of funds. However, this is merely a transfer payment unrelated to any welfare 
payment considerations and it distorts the allocation of resources and strengthens the 
need for some form of state enforced monopoly 
The bottom line is that, state-owned enterprises operate under different constraints to 
their private counterparts. They suffer from too much bureaucratic red tape problems, 
lack of accountability, and lack the incentive to innovate or venture into new 
technologies to improve production, which lead to sub optimum results being 
achieved. 
Privatisation seems to be the remedy for the above problems. As already mentioned 
privatisa\ion entails ownership change and hence incentive and constraints 
adjustments. The market economy relies upon the process of exchange and provides 
the necessary opportunities to entrepreneurs. When there is no intervention or 
individuals are allo.wed to exchange freely , economic development occurs to the 
benefit of all the participants in that economy. Thus privatisation if well done will 
ensure that goods produced are placed on the market at a fair price. 
It should be emphasised that privatisation should go hand in hand with competitive 
conditions being available in the market to ensure the incentives and constraints do 
-
change.'Competition makes sure that optimum equilibrium is obtained and thus a 
more efficient and·even distribution and allocation of resources and diffusion of 
power. Under competitive conditions, discipline is very high as the quality of 
management decisions are continuously tested in the market place for goods, labour 
and capital. Private shareholders who provide capital are usually keen to see excellent 
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performance in terms of results. These help contain the self-interested behaviour of 
the managers since they stand to lose their jobs if they do not perform. This will also 
compel managers to charge prices that maximise the value of the firm's assets. 
The threat of bankruptcy in a competitive and private environment ensures that only 
the fit Sl,lrvive. Here profit motive makes for team work within the organisation and 
between institutions imperative, and this usually leads to an efficiency-oriented 
management. For example, management effort will be directed to choosing output 
which yields the biggest margin of revenue over the costs incurred. 
The market mechanism brings,1-bout adjustments of demand and supply, it provides 
innov'ation a_rd permits the adaptation by firms to new needs and conditions 
timeously. A~ain due to its decentralised process, the market mechanism might help 
to disperse economic power, decision-making responsibility and initiative. 
Privatisation will also increase the th-base as enterprises sold will now be subjected 
to profit tax. The proceeds realised from the sales as well as the tax could be used for 
various things, such as paying national debt, providing capital funds for small 
businesses and also for the financing of basic infrastructure. The latter point is 
justified if it is for better utilisation of resources. An example is the provision of roads 
for the private sector to perform efficiently. Funds could also be used to finance tax 
cuts, which will deter capital flight and strengthen work efforts and investment. These 
would in a broader sense lead to economic growth and greater social welfare. 
Figure 3 below is used to illustrate inefficiency that might arise from the presence of 
mortopoly ( especially that of state owned enterprise) as compared to a competitive 
firm. 
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Figure 3 
y 
T 
Pm 
x 
Assuming a hypothetical economy in which two goods (sector X and sector Y) are 
produced under perfect compet~tion conditions. From Figure 3 the line TT is a 
production possibility frontier (PPF) indicating various combinations of goods and 
services (X and Y) which could be produced by fully utilising the economy's 
productive resources. The slope of the PPF represents marginal rate of production 
transformation (MRPTx,y) between the two sectors. Thus, under perfect competition, 
the economy will be operating at point E with optimal resource allocation. The 
MRPTx,y at point E will be equal to the ratio of the respective prices (MRPTx,y = 
Px/Py), represented by the line c tangent to point E. If we now assume that sector Y is 
a monopoly while sector X maintains perfect competition conditions, then it means 
the production of good Y will decline but will be sold at a higher price ( as was shown 
in Figure I) . From Figure 3, the monopolist production will be at point Mand the 
commodity price is represented by line Pm which has a gentler slope than at point E 
indicating a higher price. 
Therefore, the difference between the production points of the two commodities (E 
and M) is a reflection of the degree of allocation inefficiency arising from the 
presence of monopoly in one of the two sectors (Black and Dollery 1992). This can 
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also be interpreted to mean that the whole economy is producing too little of good Y 
relative to X at point M, and there is a potential to move to point E by reallocation of 
resources in a manner which increased the production of good Y relative to X, for the 
benefit of the whole society. 
There is also another situation of i_nefficiency associated with monopoly, and it is 
referred to as X-inefficiency. This can be associated with state owned monopoly. As 
mentioned before due to lack of threat of competition for state owned enterprises, 
slackness is very rife and production ends up not being even on the PPF but at a point 
such as M' , inside the PPF in Figure 3. So the economy has failed to achieve the 
optimal allocation of resources (Black and Dollery 1992) 
X-inefficiency may take two forms, pecuniary or real. Under pure pecuniary X-
inefficiency, resources owners are simply paid in excess of their opportunity cost. 
While marginal physical product are the same as in a competitive industry, factor 
costs are increased, quantities of resources employed are reduced and output is 
reduced (Thistle and Keeler, 1990), The cost of producing the output is increased by 
the inflated factor payments. In this case pecuniary X-inefficiency becomes the 
transfer from owners of the firm to resource suppliers, and is therefore not a social 
cost. Real x-inefficiency (the form normally associated with Leibenstein) is when 
resources suppliers are paid their opportunity cost, but being permitted to be less 
productive than they would be in a competitive industry (point M' in Figure 3). The 
result is lower marginal product, but remuneration at competitive factor prices 
implying higher cost and thus a reduction in output. Thus the real X-inefficiency 
becomes a social cost. 
There is however resistance to privatisation. The insiders at state-owned enterpris<rs, 
oppose privatisation as they fear losing income and power. Privatisation will reduce 
employment as private owners dismiss redundant workers. Private owners however, 
will only be practising the concept of marginal equivalency, whereby, it is only 
beneficial for the firm to employ factors of production, for example labour up to a 
certain level of output, beyond which any more addition is unprofitable. Under state 
owned enterprises this concept maybe ignored or overshadowed by the need to 
provide employment. As a result the state-owned enterprises may end up 
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overmanning but with lower production. Thus, these cause unwanted inefficiency 
under state-owned enterprises. 
Privatisation is also opposed because it might mean transferring monopoly from the 
state to private hands. Even though private monopoly will be more efficient than state 
monopoly due to the ability to innovate and pressure from
1
shareholders to perform, 
the important thing to consider is to have well established competitive conditions in 
place before transferring the state-owned enterprise into private hands. 
According to Brada (1996), practical difficulties normally compound resistance to 
privatisation. " The valuation of firms is difficult because capital markets barely exist, 
accounting statements can almost be meaningless, and profit and sales achieved are a 
poor guide to future viability " (Brada, 1996;P68). Therefore, suspicions naturally 
arise that buyers would be benefiting from low prices at the expense of the state. 
1.4 Can All State-Owned Enterprises be Privatised? 
This brings us to the other type of monopoly, called natural monopoly. It is whereby a 
large capital outlay gives rise to economies of scale over the entire range of its output. 
Also the minimum average cost of production might occur at the level of output 
sufficient to supply the whole market. This makes it possible for only one firm to 
operate efficiently in such a market. Examples here will be the production of some 
public utilities such as electricity and water. These industries therefore are normally 
best left for government as will be illustrated by figure 4 below. 
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Figure 4 
Pm; 
Om Ot Oe \. uant1ly 
As every industry 's survival is based on whether it can recover its costs and make 
profits, under natural monopoly it means the average cost (AC) diminishes as output 
increases. Its marginal costs (MC) thus lie below the AC over the entire output range. 
These can be seen from Figure 4. As already mentioned in the paper, perfectly 
competitive market conditions for profit maximisation is for each firm to set MC 
equal to the market price. This is represented by point E in Figure 4, with a price of Pe 
and quantity Qe. However, due to the fact that AC is above MC at this point the firm 
will be making a loss equal to SE. Thus firms which try to be competitive in this case 
will eventually close down and only one will remain now employing monopolistic 
conditions (natural monopoly) . 
Normally a monopolist will maximise profit by equating marginal revenue (MR) and 
MC, then the price charged will be Pm and quantity Qm from Figure 4. As before this 
reveals the unwanted outcome of high price and less quantity of a monopoly. 
Therefore, the government becomes the sole saviour of the society in this case. 
Various options can be employed by the state to try to provide the service cheaply and 
enough quantity for the society. The state, driven by social considerations will be 
compelled to take over such operations and charge Pe for Qe units of the service. 
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However, the loss thereof, will have to be paid for by a subsidy equal to the rectangle 
TPES in Figure 4. The big question will now be how the government raises funds for 
the subsidy?. 
This brings us to the concept of second-best theory. Whatever action the government 
takes in raising the funds for the subsidy, for example a tax increase, has to carefully 
weigh the allocative gains derived from a subsidy against the distortionary effect that 
a new or higher tax may have on the economy (tax incidence). Naturally the adoption 
of marginal cost pricing in any one industry will constitute a first-best solution only if 
there are no distortions elsewhere in the economy, that is, if all other markets are 
competitive (Black and Dollery 1992). If a new tax to pay for the subsidy introduces a 
disturbance in the rest of the economy, the first-best solution will become 
unattainable. Thus the second-best solution entails non-competitive pricing in all 
markets. 
The complementarity and substitutability between various goods and services is a 
very important phenomenon in the concept of the second-best theory. The second-best 
theory demands that if a natural monopoly is subsidised by distortionary tax that 
raises price above marginal cost in another sector of the economy, and the two goods 
concerned are substitutes, then the natural monopoly should also charge a price above 
marginal cost so as to avoid an excessive shift in demand towards its own good. If the 
goods are complements, then the natural monopoly has to make sure that it charges a 
price below marginal cost to ensure that consumers buy an efficient combination of 
the two (Black and Dollery 1992). 
The bottom line here is that a natural monopoly should remain in the hands of the 
government so as to regulate them or force them to expand output by setting price 
close to MC( price somewhere between Pa and T and quantity somewhere between 
Qe and Qt). Thus privatisation should be analysed based on whether a particular 
enterprise is an artificial monopoly or natural monopoly. 
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1.5 Empirical Evidence on the Efficiency of the SOE and Privatisation 
Privatisation as already mentioned is a policy for both developing and developed 
countries. The question that then follows is how easy countries are able to perform 
this task. As Krippner ( 1997 :6) puts it, "state intervention is sometimes driven out of 
proportion by recipients of state services who tend to reinterpret benefits as rights". 
This is usually supported by the state especially to sustain legitimacy. This therefore 
makes privatisation policy a difficult task for some countries to implement while it is 
even easier for others. 
According to the World Development Report (1996:9), formal privatisation may be 
accomplished in one or two years, but changing the fundamental governance of large 
firms always takes longer. The mammoth task is developing market supporting 
institutions such as legal and financial systems. This involves change in skills, 
organisations and attitudes. Another impeding factor can be from the labour force 
which normally associates privatisation with loss of employment. 
However, in some instances the labour force or the masses are very willing to let 
state-owned enterprises be sold. An example of this is the privatisation of an agro-
industrial firm in Mexico (The Mexican Coffee Institute). According to Krippner 
( 1997), the rural population of Mexico had depended on this enterprise for their 
employment, financing, processing and marketing commodities produced by small 
holders for many years and one would have expected the government to encounter 
serious resistance when trying to pull out. The answer to this is that people have 
become aware of the benefits associated with privatisation. The World Development 
Report ( 1996) points out that the empirical evidence comparing public and private 
enterprises in industrial market economies concludes that private firms exhibit higher 
productivity and better performance than public enterprises. The same report showed 
that an analysis of sixty-one privatised companies in six developing and twelve 
developed countries revealed that at least two-thirds of them, had increased their 
profits, sales, operating efficiency and capital investment. All these were purported to 
be " .... with no evidence of falling employment" (World Development Report, 1996 
:49). 
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According to Deme (1996:88) the 29 Sub-Saharan African Countries listed by the 
World Bank have eliminated 550 companies from their government portfolio, and 
from those, Benin, Nigeria, Guinea, Mozambique, Gh~uia and Senegal represent two-
thirds of state withdrawal operations. The table below compares privatisation in Sub-
Saharan Africa with those in other less developed countries. It can be seen that the 
process slowed down as time went on, especially for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Table 1 
Number of Privatisation in less developed countries 
1980-1991 1988-1992 
No. of % No.of % Privatisatio 
Enterprises Enterprises Value 
Middle East 58 4.3 11 8.9 1133 
Asia 122 9.0 29 23.5 8778 
Sub/S.Africa 373 27.5 5 4.1 33 
Latin America 
& Caribbean 804 59.2 78 63.4 37270 
Total 1357 100 123 100 47124 
Figures in millions of Dollars 
Source: Deme (1997:89) 
Deme ( 1997), also points to the little influence the selling of public enterprises had on 
market structures. "In certain cases they increased industrial and financial 
concentration into the hands of certain families or groups close to those in power, 
and as a result public monopolies have been transformed into private monopolies " 
(Deme, 1997:89) This basically shows how privatisation if hastily implemented can 
be a failure. Therefore, the process needs full consultation of all the parties concerned, 
and a clear picture of how the whole society stands to benefit. 
Another study in Hartnett (1997), by Meggison et al, showed that the firms they 
studied in 18 countries became more efficient after privatisation. Although evidence 
, of restructuring through privatisation differs among countries, there is more evidence 
to the effect that many state owned enterprises have responded along the lines 
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expected of firms whose managers are fulfilling the objectives of wealth-maximising 
.. 
owners. According to Brada (1996:80), surveys of firms in countries such as Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia and Poland revealed that when restructuring or transformation was 
implemented, managers undertook short-term adjustments in output and input levels 
that are broadly consistent with what would be expected of profit maximising firms. 
Output, employment and capacity were reduced to reflect market demand. Managers 
also attempted to reduce operating costs and exposure to bad debts. 
Another motivation for state-owned enterprises to become more efficient might just 
be a mere possibility of entry. The thr~at of substituting new firms for existing ones 
might offer a sufficient spur to make existing producers perform more efficiently. For 
example, management take-overs could be encouraged for utilities that do not meet 
service or productivity criteria. 
Therefore, the important lesson from the evidence is the importance of competitive 
conditions and change in regulatory policies, as well as ownership for incentives and 
efficiency. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.0 Economics of Airline I Aviation 
It is a known fact that air service like other modes of transportation (rail and road) is a 
very essential input into the socio-economic life of a country. They can be regarded in 
loose terms as lubricants of the economy. They are means to an end because they 
open up new opportunities for production, consumption and external linkages or 
relationships of a country. 
Transportation services besides those of carriers are mainly not an end in themselves. 
They may be required as a need to fulfil another objective. An example is that, 
transportation may be needed as part of a business trip, holiday or weekend visit to 
watch a sports fixture (Doganis, 1993). This therefore, makes transportation services a 
derived demand in that it is dependent on the demand for these other activities. It also 
implies that to forecast the demand for air services one must forecast the demand for 
all these other types of expenditure. The airlines are thus put under pressure when 
selling themselves to " .. expand into other areas of travel industry such as hotels, tour 
organisers and travel agencies in a bid to gain total control over the travel product " 
(Doganis, 1993 :21 ). This notion is also in line with the behaviour of airline 
advertisements which try to interest people in a particular destination or particular 
type of trip upfront while the costs and the name of the airline seem to come as an 
afterthought. 
One important point that must be understood is that the airline products are 
h9mogenous in nature. There is little difference between one jet aircraft and another if 
they achieve similar journey times. A freight forwarder ' s major decision will be to 
choose,whether to ship by air or surface, and once a decision is made on air 
conveyance, then which airline to use is taken to be a minor one. The matter here is 
that airlines end up offering very similar products. 
The resultant effects of the homogenous nature of the airline products are that iri 
competitive conditions airlines make costly efforts to try to differentiate their products 
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element of government failure due to this association. Therefore, it is recommended that 
SAA has restructured enough to be privatised. The kind of privatisation for this is the 
strategic partnership because of its gradual approach element. The gradual approach is 
crucial because it is not likely to cause much resistance from the labour force and safety 
requirements in airline business is not compromised. 
from that of their competitors. This is done by advertising, the first to introduce new 
aircraft types as well as increasing frequency of service. Doganis ( 1993 :21 ), 
highlighted this by saying "much of the advertising is aimed at trying to convince 
passengers or .freight agents that the product they offer can be differentiated from that 
of their competitors because of the .friendliness of the hostesses or the culinary 
expertise of their chefs, or because of other claims which are dubious and difficult to 
assess ". 
2.1 Regulation of Air Transportation 
Authorities in different countries have in the past accepted that states have sovereign 
rights in the air space above their territory, so direct government intervention in air 
transport resulted. Air space became a country' s yaluable natural resource. Thro~gh 
this intervention the governments formulated Aviation Acts to regulate the number of 
airlines operating in a particular market. By so doing the government controls entry 
through a requirement in the Act that stipulates that every air carrier needs to obtain a 
certificate from the authorities to venture into air transportation over stipulated routes. 
Exit is also controlled in that authorities must approve the dropping of a route by an 
airline (O' Connor, 1978). 
The state regulation in the airline service was usually attributed to the fear that too 
many airlines in the more lucrative markets might .result in wasteful duplication, 
overcapacity, too many empty seats and higher rather than lower costs. Rate wars may 
also reslflt in ner omers in a market trying to undercut the existing rates in a bid to 
J,ecome established, but only leading to the incumbent carriers cutting their rates even 
lower. This process might continue to the detriment of a stable, safe and reliable air 
service. Another reason for government intervention 
1
is related to the "cream-
skimming" operators. This is whereby an airline jumps into the market over a holiday 
... 
period when it knows it will carry full flights, and then disappear or not serve the 
market at times of leaner traffic (O'Connor, 1978). For South Africa this was not 
exaci:J¥, the problem, but authorities had to take precaution to prevent it from 
happening. 
J 
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It should also be borne in mind that regulation is a broad concept. It can also refer to 
the technical and safety requirements that are not specific to a particular airline but 
which are general to most countries and are promulgated as regulations of the civil 
aviation i_n different countries. Controls of fares, freight tariffs, frequencies and 
capacity are all part and parcel of the regulations. 
Having said that, the significant role transport plays in the social and economic 
development of South Africa led to the government recognising it as one of its main 
priority areas for socio-economic development (Department of Transport 1996). 
Table 2 shows the contribution of transportation and communication to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) over the years. As can be seen per the arrangement of the 
Table, this sector follows the economic business cycle. The changes are from different 
quarters (qtr) over the years. 
Table 2 
Changes in Real GDP 
Average Annualised Percentage Changes in Seasonally adjusted quarterly data 
Sector Upswing Downswing Upswing Downswing Upswing 
2nd qtr 83 to 3rd qtr 84 to 2nd qtr 86 to 2nd qtr 89 to 3rd qtr 93 to 
2nd qtr 84 I st qtr 86 lstqtr89 2nd qtr 93 2nd qtr 96 
Transport & 
Communicati I I -2.5 3.5 4 
on 
Source: SARB Annual Reports( 1984-1997) 
Therefore, it is apparent from the above discussion that every country would want to 
start by regulating its aviation business as a bid to- enhance its economic prosperity. 
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This might involve protecting infant domestic airlines from the fully fledged foreign 
competitors who might only be interested in maximising profits. However, there is 
always the problem of the infant industries hiding behind state protection and thus 
staying "infant" forever. The resultant effects of these are inefficiency which leads to 
the reduction in the contribution of the sector to the socio-economic life of a country 
(negating the main objective of protection) and waste of state funds. 
2.2 South African Airways-Historical background 
Civil Aviation in South Africa dates back to the beginning of the 19th century when 
people were just curious and imaginative of how to travel between the major centres 
of the country within a shorter time. Others were being adventurous and wanted to 
take advantage of the all year favourable South African climate and fly. 
However, the· state became involved through the airforce in 1921. An organisation 
called the Civil Air Board was formed in 1921 to draft some aviation regulations. 
From this Union Aviation was passed by parliament in 1923, which provided 
-legislation for the granting of aviation licences: The act also required that pilots had to 
fly a mjnimum of two hundred hours before acquiring a "B" licence, which enabled 
them to transport passengers. 
The first main recommendation of the Board was that due to the amount of time it 
takes letters to reach Durban from Cape Town by train, a passenger and airmail 
services should be operational between the two cities by the South African Airforce 
(SAAF). The government was initially reluctant to go along with these proposals 
because of financial reasons. The board had also recommended that if the SAAF 
service proves satisfactory it should be taken over by a government subsidised 
commercial company (SAA Public Relations Division, 1986). 
The government eventually approved the proposal, but only for airmail service on a 
trial basis. Thus in 1925 the first official flight was launched between Cape Town and 
Durban. The service was run for four-and half months with great technical efficiency, 
but the main obstacle was that the commercial results were disappointing. With no 
passenger revenue the expenditure was greatly in excess of the revenue earned. 
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Therefore, the future of the service was bleak, especially because it was estimated that 
a private company would need a subsidy of 25,000 pounds sterling a year to continue 
the service ( SAA Public Relations Division, 1986) 
Thus, the operation was shelved for about four years until 1929 when the government 
entered into a contract with Union Airways for the operation of airmail service 
between the main South African centres. The contract provided for a three year 
government subsidy of 8,000 pounds sterling a year for freighting mail. The South 
African government officially acquired the assets and liabilities of Union Airways and 
absorbed the company in the newly formed airways system (South African Airways) 
with a flying springbok emblem in 1934. Thus SAA started with two Gypsy Moths, a 
Puss Moth, three Junkers F13s and a Junkers W34, offering chartered and scheduled 
flights ( SAA Public Relations Division, 1986) 
From then on with financial backing of the Railways (cross subsidisation) the SAA 
grew stronger and stronger. They also acquired South West African Airways as 
demand for air service increased. During this period the headquarters and 
maintenance base were in Durban. However the increase in importance of 
Johannesburg as the centre of the route network led to the headquarters being moved 
to the Johannesburg Rand Airport. 
Although SAA operations fell back in the war years of 1940 to 1944, a network of 
domestic services were immediately resumed and new ones opened after the wars. 
SAA quickly enhanced its reputation in the civil aviation world. Another important 
step in the history of South African aviation was in 1953 when Jan Smuts Airport was 
officially opened, by the then minister of transport who commented that "safety, 
regularity, convenience and comfort are the key-notes of our air policy" (SAA Public 
Relations Division, 1986). This was followed by opening of airports in other main 
centres of Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth in the names ofD.F Malan, Louis 
Botha and H.F Verwoerd Airports respectively. 
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2.3 Regulation of SAA 
As already mentioned with regard to the reason for state intervention in the airline 
services, SAA was no exception from the government involvement. SAA falling 
under the South African Transport Services (SATS), together with Railways, 
Pipelines, Harbour and Road transport meant that the central government had a great 
influence on them. An example of state regulation of both international and domestic 
air services elsewhere, was shown by Doganis (1993 :46) who mentioned that " in the 
US the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was introduced to regulate and control 
competition between US domestic carriers because the unregulated competition 
which had prevailed up to then had led to chaotic conditions, little security for 
investors and low safety margins. For many years the American view was that, while 
air transport is not a natural monopoly, regulation is required because unregulated 
competitive market forces may have adverse consequences for the public at large ". 
SA TS was a commercial enterprise which had to produce and sell its services under 
market and organisational pressure. On the other hand being a public body, it had to 
function as an instrument of public policy subject to direct government control of 
many of its activities. These twin activities often put pressure on SATS leading to 
conflicting decisions being made. 
Thus the origin of government intervention in transportation in South Africa can be 
traced back to the Railway Age. Certain traffic were charged higher rates to earn 
sufficient revenue to cross subsidise unprofitable ones. Airline services were among 
those which needed cross-subsidisation as they were still emerging. Therefore, 
regulation was seen as an attempt to achieve a balanced, integrated and cordinated 
system. It could only be justified on the basis of the interest of public policy. 
However, government policy always left some room for internal competition with 
SAA. Even though this was the case, the role of domestic airlin~s was mainly limited 
to providing feeder services, linking up with SAA's scheduled services. The Air 
Services Act regulated scheduled passenger air services in South Africa and elements 
of control included entry to the industry, data requirements when applying for a 
license and protection of operators offering a satisfactory service. Therefore, once an 
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airline had received permission to operate a service on a route, that route virtually 
becomes its property and no other airline may operate a service there. Airlines 
operated freely on routes they had sole right, which meant that they could make any 
decision on the frequency of flights and the fares they charge. 
As a result of the regulating system, SAA maintained a dominant share in domestic 
services. This is illustrated by Table 3 below with SAA licensed to fly directly among 
the main centres in South Africa. Afl are direct flights from Johannesburg (JHB) to 
other towns of Cape Town (CPT), Port Elizabeth (PE), Durban(Dur), East London 
(E.L), Bloemfontein (Blm), George (Geo), Nelspruit (Nels) and Kimberly (Kim). 
Table 3. 
Airlines involved in the South African domestic air service as at December 1997 
CPT 
I.SA 
Express 
PE 
lSAA 
2.Comair 2.Sun 
3.SAA 
4.Sun 
Air 
5.Nation 
Wide 
Air 
Dur 
ISA 
Express 
2.Comair 
3.SAA 
4.Sun 
Air 
From JHB to 
EL 
I.SAA 
Blm 
I.SAA 
Geo 
I.SAA 
2.SA 
Express 
Nels Kim 
l .Metari JSA 
a Express 
Express 
Table 3 reveals the presence of SAA to all th~ major cities in South Africa while other 
private airlines can only operate between a few cities. There seems to be a fair amount 
of competition between JHB and Cape Town (five airlines) as well as between JHB 
and Durban (four airlines). This could be attributed mainly to the flow of tourists to 
-
these cities. An analysis of aviation policy in South Africa is complex because it is 
divided into two distinct areas of domestic policy and international policy. Domestic 
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policies are those the government has full power to regulate such as air transport, 
aviation safety, airports and airspace. On the other hand international policies are 
those based on international air transport and relationships with international 
organisations and other governments. The international policy was subjected to 
intense political pressures throughout the 1980s as a result of protests about apartheid. 
According to Pirie (1992:341), the mid 1980s saw Australia and the USA revoking 
SAA's lending rights and forbidding airlines registered in their countries from flying 
to South Africa. Other carriers such as Canada, closed their offices and terminated 
representation in South Africa. 
It was in 1990 that drastic policy changes affecting South African Transport Services 
(SA TS) were made. It involved transforming SATS from a state corporation into a 
state-owned public company. This meant that like any private sector company it must 
tum a profit and pay tax. Thus SATS was absorbed into Transnet which consists of a 
group of enterprises engaged in transport, namely Spoornet, SAA, PX, Portnet and 
Metrorail. 
For civil aviation, the above policy changes meant that the principle of open 
competition began to prevail. Domestic air transport was deregulated further in 1991, 
with the main thrust that economic decisions be left to competitive forces to resolve, 
the importance of safety, users interest and views specifically taken into consideration 
and that all operators be subject to the same rules (Department of Transport 1996). 
The following points were accepted to apply as domestic air transport policy; 
• SAA to operate autonomously and on a commercial basis. 
• Profits on international routes not -to be applied to subsidise losses on domestic 
routes. 
• Cross subsidisation between SAA and Transnet be prevented. 
• Service to government not be rendered below actual cost. 
• SAA not to enjoy any privileges regarding airport facilities. 
• SAA not to enjoy any privileges in terms of any legislation or any practice 
• No government guarantees for loans to any airline be issued. 
There is also the independent Air Service licensing Council (ASLC) which is 
28 
responsible for the licensing of domestic air service operators. According to the 
Department of transport (1996:31), the ASLC uses the following criteria in their 
licence allocation roles; 
• The applicant's ability to provide a safe and reliable service. 
• The applicant's adherence to the prescribed requirements for insurance. 
• The requirements that 75% of the service be owned by South Africans. 
• The requirements that, except with prior approval, South African aircraft are to be 
used in providing the air service. 
• That the air service would actively and effectively be under the control and 
management of the applicant. 
With this background the role of the Department of Transport is to police the 
applicant's operations with regard to safe and reliable air service, by issuing an 
operating certificate to a licensee every year. 
On the other hand, international air freight services were also deregulated to some 
extent. Certain categories of air freight services can currently be allowed without any 
economic control and others are economically regulated (Department of Transport, 
1996:33). However, the implementation or enforcement of this policy might be a 
headache for authorities because certain carriers could by pass the provisions of the 
policy and gain advantage over South African carriers resulting in a disadvantage to 
the country and its air carriers. World trends in air line corporation and their effects 
may cause South African policies to become more difficult to enforce. 
It is clear from the above discussions that the government has basically 
commercialised SAA. Therefore, being commercialised SAA is expected to be 
financially self reliant and conduct its affairs in accordance with generally accepted 
business principles and practice. Under commercialisation objectives SAA is also 
expected to expand its activities and gain market share at the expense of private 
airlines. However, this tends to negate the government's stated intentions to diminish 
its direct involvement in the economy. 
In conclusion there is no question that the state has played an important role in the 
operations of SAA. What remains is to find out whether the deregulation (less state 
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involvement) has led to the viability of SAA on a commercial basis and if that can 
open ways for privatisation. As will be discussed in the next chapter there is also a 
need find out whether there is still a need for the government to continue to be 
involved in SAA in a competitive environment because this violates one of the perfect 
competition market conditions of equal competition constraints and opportunities. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.0 SAA's Performance Before and After Deregulation 
This chapter sets out to find to what extent the government regulation of SAA had 
influenced the behaviour of SAA in terms of cost, efficiency, resource allocation, and 
profitability. As already mentioned in the previous chapters regulation can be counter-
productive and defeat its own objectives. The above points will be analysed by 
comparing the performance of SAA during the regulation period and the post 
regulation period. The comparison of SAA to the existing private airlines in South 
Africa has not been possible due to a lack of data from the private airlines, who for 
competitive reasons hold such information in confidentiality. 
3.1 Regulation Period 
Doganis (1993), has shown that airline business is not a natural monopoly. In South 
Africa this can be substantiated by the existence of four small private airlines during 
the years of regulation. The presence of only four private airlines was due to the 
state ' s policy of allowing only a limited amount of competition in the domestic 
market. 
The regulation policy, therefore, allowed SAA to enjoy the monopolistic profits as far 
as the direct flight markets were concerned, since the other four private airlines only 
served as feeder airlines. As a result of this, there was limited pricing freedom and 
product differentiation as well as limited capacity growth. The consumers were 
therefore, denied the benefits of lower fares , innovative pricing and greater product 
. / 
differentiation. Lower tariffs or co1~petitive pricing usually has the advantage of 
forcing an airline to re-examine its costs and would force it to improve its efficiency 
and productivity. Lower costs would also facilitate further reductions in fares and as a 
result inefficient airlines might be forced out of a particular market (Doganis, 1993). 
In contrast all these were lacking in the South African domestic airline market. SAA 
based its pricing policy on distance rather than costs. This was mainly encouraged by 
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the prevalent cross-subsidisation policy, in that profit making routes were used to 
uplift the loss making ones. 
The regulatory system in South Africa therefore, meant SAA could largely decide on 
the frequency of flights and the fares it charged. Fares were based on distance even 
though the costs of air service differed widely among markets of a given distance. The 
strategy followed was to set fares below cost for short distance markets and above 
costs for long distance markets. However, this seemed to be an inappropriate policy 
because, the volume of travel in a market would affect costs, but SAA continued 
using it. Figure 5 below (adapted from Black, Baird and Heese 1997) is used to 
illustrate the point. 
Figure 5 
PRICE/ KILOMETRE 
MC 
AC 
Pc 
IMC' AC ' 
. . I J 
'{, I / 
! ..... ______________________ ! i__ ____ ...... / 
D 
MR 
0 QUANTITY 
Source: Adapted from Black, Baird and Heese 1997 
In this figure it is assumed that during regulation SAA was faced with a high cost 
structure as shown by AC and MC. The fare discrimination practise was to avoid 
making loses. Thus for long distance market a fare of OP 1 was charged for OQ 1 of the 
service. For the short distance market a fare of OPc was charged for (OQ2 - OQ 1 ) of the 
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service. Total revenue was (P1BQ10 + CEQ2Q1) which is larger than what could be 
received if there is no fare discrimination (P cEQ20). This total revenue is also assumed 
to be larger than the total cost of AFQ20. Thus SAA's persistent use of this strategy 
was mainly because the profits made on long distance markets exceeded the losses 
made on the short distance market. 
However, the analysis in figure 5 will be different if SAA is privatised or the market 
highly deregulated. Under such regimes there will be pressure for the principal -agent 
relations to change to the better, such as, significant cost reduction to AC' and MC' in 
figure 5. Thus free entry and competition would force SAA to charge a fare lying 
somewhere between the new monopoly fare (point M) and competition fare solution 
at point T. The net effect is that there will be more services provided at a much 
reduced fare (Black, Baird and Heese 1997:238). 
Another effect of the regulatory system, was shown by SAA' s dominance in domestic 
services against the four private airlines (Comair, Magnum Air, Namib Air and Cape 
Air). This dominance however was not based on the notion of the most efficient being 
able to command the largest market. Figure 6 shows the number of passengers carried 
by SAA from 1988 to 1997. 
33 
Figure 6 
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Source: Transnet Annual Reports (1987-1997) 
It shows passengers carried falling after 1991 and staying almost constant until 1995. 
This fall was mainly attributed to loosing some passengers to other competing 
airlines, especially for the domestic market while internationally, air travel was 
mainly hampered by the Gulf War. The increase in passengers again from 1995 could 
be attributed to new strategies employed by the airline to attract more passengers. 
SAA' s revenue mainly came from passenger business, followed by freight and airmail 
transportation (which it had sole rights to carry ). As a result of its dominance in the 
market, it also meant that profits were dominated or monopolised. 
As far as efficiency is concerned we have seen in our previous discussions that a firm 
will be allocatively efficient if it operates at a point were marginal costs are equal to 
price. The discussion has shown that under natural monopoly this would be 
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impossible as the firm's average costs will be greater than the price at that point, and 
thus huge losses will be incurred, leading to the nationalisation of such an enterprise. 
However, since SAA is an artificial monopoly ( only limited competition allowed), it 
means it was not allocatively efficient and there is thus room for improvement. 
. 
Therefore, SAA can be allocatively efficient if free entry is allowed which might lead 
to perfect competition-and prices equal to the marginal costs being charged. From 
Figure 1, SAA could be currently operating somewhere between Qm and Qc and 
charging a pr~ce between Pm and Pc if not exactly at Qm and Pm. An improvement in 
allocative efficiency of SAA will involve moving production more towards Qc and 
charging Pc at point C in Figure 1. 
3.2 Deregulation Period 
On July 1, 1990, Parliament approved the deregulation of the local air transport 
sector. By then SAA already had a fleet of two Boeing 747-344's, six Boeing 747-
244's, five Boeing Z47 SP's, seventeen Boeing 737-244's and eight Airbus A300's 
(Annual Report, 1993). A new Boeing 747-400 was added to the fleet in 1991. "This 
put SAA within the ranks of the world 's fifty largest airlines " (Annual Report, 
1993:25). Thi~ is obviously a boastful comment, but it raises the question of capacity 
utilisation, that is, whether this fleet was really needed and to what extent they were 
efficiently operated. My view is that these were acquired mainly for pride and because 
. . 
the govel1)1Ilent provided the funds for them. The acquisition of the new 8747-400 did 
not just involve the purchase cost, but due to its high technology ( digital cockpit) it 
differed a lot from the other aircraft in the SAA stable. Special skills had to be 
acquired for its specialised maintenance as well as simulators, featuring the latest 
technology being purchased to assist in the training of 8747-400 and A320 pilots. 
Therefore, it can be said that SAA supplied more flights and seats than was 
economically efficient. 
Deregulation brought some discipline in SAA as was shown by the 1992 annual 
report. " .... although a minor portion of SAA 's operations, freight volume conveyed 
during ihe 199 2 financial year rose substantially when compared to the previous 
year, aggressive competition and low rates resulted in this business showing a low 
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y ield." Annual Report 1992:25 ). SAA was already feeling the heat of competition in 
the business it used to dominate. The deregulation of the domestic air travel industry 
resulted in one major competitor (Flites.tar) entering the market during 1992. 
Although deregulation exerted pressure on air fares (a positive move for consumers, 
but not for SAA) renewed competition resulted in improved customer service and 
more frequent flights to and from the major business centres. 
Figure 7 below shows how SAA's cargo dominance changed overtime. It reveals that 
SAA's dominance of the cargo business in absolute terms was reduced greatly after 
deregulation in 1990. 
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Figure 7 
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Flitestar managed to take 25% of SAA's market share on the routes they both shared. 
SAA in a bid to maintain its market share introduced discounted fares (undercutting 
pricing) and marketed special tour packages catering to various audiences and events 
(Annual Report 1992). Also to reduce costs no major purchase was made during the 
year1. A-ccording to the "Financial Mail" (October 30, 1992), there was no doubt that 
SAA's load / actors were low. It could carry the same number of passengers with 
~ewer a_ircraft, except in peak periods. This option would have allowed it to lease o~t 
its surplus aircraft. This would have been a perfect strategy for SAA to adopt in a bid 
to reduce its capacity by 25% (market share taken by Flitestar). 
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As a result of competition pressure and in a bid to stem losses, SAA embarked on a 
" .. .project success aimed at turning the airline around so as to lead to profitability in 
the future" (Annual Report, 1993 :25 ). This involved closing of two overseas offices, 
reduced route networks through code sharing, the right sizing of staff by means of a 
voluntary retrenchment package and the sale of some of the older aircraft. 
Figure 8 below shows how the number of employees fell from above 12000 in 1990, 
and kept declining until 1994. This w;:is mainly due to the cost cutting strategy of 
voluntary retrenchment. However, it increased again from 1995 due to the new 
government's affirmative action policies, which compelled SAA to employ more 
blacks without having to lay off the whites. 
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Fares also generally decreased, or increased at a decreasing rate after deregulation as 
revealed by Table 4. This was mainly attributed to competition pressure rather than 
inflation becoming down. 
Table 4. 
Economy Class Fares between Cape Town and Johannesburg 
Year Average Fare % Change 
1988 189 
1989 213 I I 
1990 213 
1991 234 8.97 
1992 247 5.26 
1993 310 20 
1994 326 5 
1995 336 3 
1996 395 15 
1997 410 4 
Fares increased at a decreasing rate from 1990 to 1992. However, in 1993 it increased 
by 20%. This was mainly attributed to the Competition Board's recommendations that 
SAA should increase its fares accordingly and stop using predatory pricing to block 
competition. This was as a result of the Cometition Board's findings that SAA 
charged uneconomic prices intentionally to drive out compeJitors. The fares were also 
adjusted over the years taking into consideration the fuel prices. 
Different airlines charged different fares mainly due to the availability of discounts to 
a relatively few passengers. This suggests that airlines were now exercising their fare 
flexibility to a considerable degree. 
According to Graham, Kaplan and Sibley ( 1991 ), there are usually economies of scale 
and economies of utilisation in providing air service on a given route. The implication 
of this is that airlines can reduce costs by operating larger aircraft at higher load 
factors. However, passengers ' demand for convenient service would generally require 
carriers to operate more frequent flights , using smaller aircraft at lower load factors, 
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than simple cost minimisation dictates. This has been shown by Graham et al ( 1991 ), 
to be especially true in short-haul markets, where surface transportation is quite 
competitive with air travel. Therefore, deregulation of aviation in South Africa has 
given SAA and other carriers the operating flexibility to choose the combination of 
fares, aircraft size, and load factors to maximise profit in each market. 
In their paper "Efficiency and Competition in the Airline Industry" Graham et al 
( 1991 : 123 ), show that aircraft size and load factor tend to be higher in ~arkets where 
travellers place relatively little value on convenience, passengers in vacation markets 
for an example are generally not very time sensitive. The implication from this is 
therefore, that heavily travelled routes such as Johannesburg-Cape Town and 
Johannesburg-Durban (tourists places) would have larger aircraft and higher load 
factors because of diminishing returns in terms of passenger's willingness to pay for 
increased convenience. 
Having said that, deregulation also has some other effects besides an improvement in 
the operation of an airline and consumers benefiting from lower fares. A study by 
Kim and Lichtenberg (1989), shows that deregulation in the US led to mergers of 
many airlines. These mergers were associated with reduction in unit cost. "The 
average annual rate of unit cost growth of carriers undergoing merger was 1.1 
percentage point lower, during the period of mergers, than that of carriers not 
involved in merger. Part of the cost reduction is attributable to merger related 
declines in the price of inputs, particularly labour, but about two-thirds of it is due to 
increased total factor productivity. One source of the productivity increase is an 
increase in capacity utilisation (load factor) " (Kim and Lichtenberg 1989: 1 ). A 
-
typical example to this effect in South Africa could be the franchise agreement 
between British Airways and Coma~r. Although one might worry about the negative 
effect of mergers through the reduction of consumer welfare by reducing competition 
and thus increasing the fare, it seems to be offset by a number of traveller benefits that 
mergers might provide. 
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Even though it might not be evident yet in South Africa, evidence elsewhere (US), has 
shown that deregulation has led to the growth of hub and spoke operations. This 
means that major airlines tend to have one or more hubs at which many of their long 
distance passengers change planes. The advantage of this is that, it allows carriers to 
fill higher proportion of the seats on their planes and to increase flight frequency of 
non stop routes between their hubs and other airports (Borenstein, 1992). However, a 
draw back to hub and spoke operation is that a larger proportion of passengers change 
planes, especially on longer trips, instead of flying non-stop from their origin to their 
destination. Changing airlines imposes substantial additional costs on passengers, due 
to increased probability of missed connections and lost baggage (Borenstein 1992). In 
the South African domestic market, a passenger does not have to change a plane 
unless there is no direct flight to the passenger's destination from where the passenger 
originates, which means that they have to fly first to where there is a direct flight. 
Another benefit of deregulation in South African air travel is the increase in the 
choice of departure times. For example, routes between Cape Town-Johannesburg and 
Johannesburg-Durban are no longer thinly travelled like during the times of 
regulation. This is due to increased entry (more competition) into these markets. 
One factor that might affect competition and efficiency in the domestic market is the 
airport capacity shortage. During regulation this was never a problem in South Africa, 
but now with increased competition, airport congestion is likely to result. For 
example, in a few years time Cape Town airport might not be able to handle both the 
domestic and international flights requiring another new airport. However, as 
Borenstein (1992:52), puts it, "it is the cost of the success of airline deregulation". 
Hopefully the commercialisation ( or privatisation) of the airport company will be able 
to control this problem. One approach would be to impose congestion based landing 
fees, which would increase at times of peak demand. 
Borenstein (1992:53), mentioned that, " .. .. for many economists and policy-makers, 
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advocacy of airline deregulation was simply a rejection of the incredibly inefficient 
regulation of the previous years. On the other hand, others supported deregulation 
based on contestability theory, that is, they relied on the disciplining effect of 
potential competition ". The text book theories generally conclude that actual or 
potential competition would drive all prices to the marginal costs of the most efficient 
firms, with less efficient airlines reorganising or exiting the industry. However, in 
reality the outcome might be a bit different. This is a warning that before one can 
bank on potential competition, the importance of airline networks and hub operations 
should be taken into account. 
Deregulation is usually associated with price wars, as incumbent operators try to 
block or make newcomers' operations unprofitable. This was no exception in South 
African aviation. After the entry of Flitestar, it was found that SAA started practising 
predatory pricing to push Flitestar out. Flitestar, complained to the Competition Board 
that the playing fields were not yet level which made it operate in a market which 
persistently features residues of the monopolistic structures of the past years. The 
main problem was the unrealistically low fare structures practised by SAA. Another 
complaint was the agreement between SAA and Comair, which led to Comair leasing 
a Boeing 737-200 frorri SAA at favourable rates. This was seen by Flitestar as a 
collusion to oust it out of the market, since the Boeing was used on the same route 
Flitestar operated. 
In a bid to rally behind deregulation, the Competition Board set out to investigate why 
SAA was not profitable. The results came in support of Flitestar' s complaints, and the 
Competition Board recommended that SAA should raise fares by 20% and cut its 
flights by 30% on ifs three main local routes to restore ·it to overall profitability 
("Finance Week", 1993). This strengthened the view that SAA, being a State owned 
enterprise, enjoyed effective subsidy from tax payer assistance and abused it by 
financing uneconomic fares and routes. Although the increase in fares would have 
negative effects to the consumers, it would only be a short term measure and they 
would benefit from this in the long run. 
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Another measure which could have been thought to hinder newcomers to gain market 
share is SAA' s well established Frequent Flyer programme. This means that SAA 
would have the advantage of having secured and "trapped" customers into this 
programme, and thus making them inaccessible to newcomers. In fact Flitestar had 
already complained about this to the Competition Board before it exited the market. 
However, the Competition Board discontinued the investigations after Flitestar' s exit 
from the market. Therefore, assuming that indeed marketing strategies such as the 
Frequent Flyer programme, corporate discounts and commissions paid to agents by 
SAA can hinder newcomers' market gain, then it can only be said that SAA 
succeeded in ousting Flitestar from the market. 
The figure below shows SAA' s profits over the years under consideration. It shows 
that it has not been consistent in its bid to make profit. Though having said that, newly 
restructured state owned enterprise ' s measures intended to restore long term viability 
may require large losses in the short term. 
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Figure 9 
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In conclusion deregulation and some of the Competition Board' s recommendations 
forced SAA to restructure its operations drastically since 1992. This was basically to 
rationalise markets, improve communication, competitiveness, aircraft capacity and 
human resource utilisation, cut costs, optimise assets, review financing costs, 
reorganise SAA and build international alliances. Some of these included retrenching 
close to 2500 employees, selling its head office building in Braarnfontein, closing two 
foreign offices in Copenhagen and Buenos Aires and selling four Boeings 737s and a 
747 kombi by the end of 1994. 
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Tables 5 and 6 below show some performance extracts and consolidated results of 
SAA respectively from the 1997 annual report. Table 5 shows that there has not been 
much improvement in SAA's operations. Market share has dropped in all the areas 
while total costs and efficiency still need to be kept under control. 
Table 5 
Performance Measurement 
1997 1996 
Efficiency 
Total operating costs per revenue passenger kilometre (cents) 46,3 37,7 
Personnel cost per revenue passenger kilom¢tre (cents) 9,7 8,9 
Turnover per employee (ROOO) 542,9 483,9 
Available seat kilometre per employee (million kilometres) 2,1 1,9 
Effectiveness 
Revenue passengers (million) 5 
Passenger income per revenue passenger kilometre ( cents) 34 
Market Share: Domestic(%) 60 
Market Share: International(%) 35 
Market Share: Regional (%) 33 
Economy 
Total operating costs per available seat (cents) 29,7 
Personnel costs per available seat kilometre (cents) 6,2 
Source(Transnet Annual Report, 1997) 
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Table 6 
Results as at 31st March 1997 (Rand Million) 
1997 1996 
Internal and External turnover 5680 5013 
Net (loss)/profit after finance cost (323) 324 
Total Operating Assets 5320 5175 
Capital expenditure 535 918 
Number of Employees 11598 10574 
Source (Transnet Annual Report, 1997) 
It reveals that SAA reversed the results of the previous year by almost the same 
amount. However , one is unable to read much from figures like this . Public 
corporations normally use replacement costs of capital in addition to ordinary 
depreciation to report their performance. Since these are charged to current income, 
the accounts normally show huge losses or small profits and do not reveal the actual 
large cash flows of the corporation. The implication here is that, if replacement 
costs as well as depreciation are added back to the current income, then there will 
be a large difference between the reported profit or loss and the cashflow generated. 
Therefore, cash flow analysis of SAA would give a better picture as to whether it is 
financially viable for privatisation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 Efficiency After Deregulation 
As can be seen from the discussions in the previous chapter, deregulation causes high 
anticipation of reduction of costs. In different ways deregulation and changing the 
property rights within airline firms can be expected to shift cost functions downward 
and permit increased output, lower final service prices and more efficient resource 
allocation. This chapter attempts to determine whether deregulation really had an 
effect on the operations of SAA. 
An attempt was made to test the exceS's capacity of SAA using load factors. Load 
factor in this case is defined as the passengers carried as a percentage of the seats 
available for sale. The hypothesis is that SAA' s capacity utilisation should have 
increased after deregulation given the new strategies employed such as selling some 
of its old aircraft and leasing out others. A regression was run using the load factor as 
the dependent variable and time in years as the independent variable. A dummy 
variable was used to show the structural break between the regulation and 
deregulation periods. Therefore, for regulation period 1988 to 1990 a dummy variable 
was generated with a value equal to zero, and from 1991 to 1997 another dummy 
variable equal to one was generated. Two dummies were used to see whether there 
was anything between the two periods that could not be explained by the model. The 
table below shows the result of the regression. 
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The model is as follows : LOADFACTOR = a 0 + f3 1YEAR + l3iDUM + f33DUMMY 
LS LOADF C YEAR DUM DUMMY 
Number of observations: 10 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG. 
c -956.00000 857.70025 -1.1146085 0.3077 
YEAR 0.5000000 0.4312218 1.1594961 0.2903 
DUM -1820.4427 887.95308 -2.0501565 0.0862 
DUMMY 0.9142857 0.4463570 2.0483284 0.0864 
R-squared 0.980474 Mean of dependent var 42.10000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.970711 S.D. of dependent var 3.563394 
S.E. of regression 0.609840 Sum of squared resid 2.231427 
Log likelihood -6.689666 F-statistic I 00.4277 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.525515 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000016 
--- - ------------------------- - ---------------------------
The table reveals that at 5% level of significance our dummy variable (DUM) is 
insignificant. This basically tells a different story from what we anticipated. It means 
that SAA' s capacity utilisation is still very low. The interactive dummy variable 
(DUMMY) is also insignificant at 5% level of significance. It supports the findings 
that SAA' s capacity utilisation has not yet improved even after deregulation. These 
findings are quite interesting given that one expects deregulation to have forced SAA 
to improve its capacity utilisation. This could be mainly attributed to the data used. 
SAA does not keep accounting records which could generally be used in statistical 
analysis. 
On the other hand, the R2 and the adjusted R2 are high at 98% and 97% respectively. 
This means that the load factors are explained to a high degree by the relevant 
independent variables. The F-Statistic is significant at 5% level of significance. This 
basically means that the independent variables explains the variations in the load 
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factor ( a confirmation of the R2 ). The inference from this test is however that, 
SAA' s capacity utilisation still needs to be dealt with. 
Admittedly, it will not be strong enough to just conclude about the effects of airline 
deregulation in South Africa based on profits before and after deregulation. Since 
airline business depends more on the economic cycle, it is important to bear in mind 
that the profits are bound to be biased indicators as they would be low in periods of 
recessions and high in boom periods. Thus, this would have nothing to do with the 
effects of deregulation. 
Thistle and Keeler ( 1990), investigated the behaviour of airline costs after 
deregulation. They estimated the cost function as dependant on a vector of outputs, a 
vector of input prices, a vector of operating characteristics, and a variable which 
reflects the route s!ructure and scheduling as well as variables of the state of 
technology. It would have been ideal to do the same test for South Africa but as 
already mentioned a lack of data has constrained this. However, their findings were 
that there was a significant cost shift following deregulation. They also found out that 
the main component leading to decreased costs in both the short and long run was 
increased total factor productivity. This study then to some extent, supports the 
hypothesis that deregulation leads to reduced costs as they say, "The effects of US 
deregulation on costs in the short and long run should be of interest to airline 
researchers and policy makers in other countries considering changes in regulation 
and/or privatisation of other air passenger transport industries" (Thistle and Keeler 
1990:320) 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 Privatisation of SAA 
The discussions in the previous chapter show how deregulation led to changes in 
aviation in South Africa. There is no question that deregulation alone is not enough. 
The state needs to be totally out of the operations of SAA. It would be m§aningless 
for the state to open the market for competition and at the same time remain as one of 
the competitors through its involvement in SAA. The playing field should be level 
and this means the market forces should be allowed to prevail. Thus SAA should stop 
being supported by Transnet (state) and fend for itself from the capital market. SAA 
depends on Transnet for funds while Transnet gets the money from the government. 
The implication here is that since deregulation has shown what benefits can be 
accomplished by free market forces to consumers, the government can also benefit, or 
save lots of tax payers money by privatising SAA. 
Although privatisation in South Africa is not a new issu~ (Sun Air and part of Telkom 
have been privatised) it is still a sens'itive one. It is a sensitive issue because the labour 
force is still conservative about change and sceptical about the effects of privatisation. 
Also given the historical background of South Africa, that is, of high income 
inequality, high unemployment rates and the need for affirmative action, privatisation 
of SAA therefore, has to have some clearly set objectives. These objectives would 
include things such as promoting the airline service, promoting economic growth, 
increasing employment, reducing inequality, developing human resources, ensuring 
legitimacy and earning employee support 1• Privatisation then becomes complex and 
clashes between the authorities and the labour force becomes inevitable as trade off 
occurs between the above objectives and other instrumental ones such as improved 
corporate governance, improved effidency, liquidity, increased investment, 
government budget relief, widespread shareholding and full valuation of parastatal 
I W.J Hartnett, "Shares for All : Option for Distributing Wealth through Privatisation" Centre for 
Policy Studies, 1997 
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shares2. 
For SAA, as already mentioned, its efficiency has already started to improve thanks to 
deregulation. Now the government needs to pull out of SAA for the sake of fair 
competition in the airline business; The resultant efficiency gains which is attributable 
to improved corporate governance, in turn led to better basic service (for an example, 
low fares and more choice of flight time). There will also be more funds (investment) 
as people buy shares in SAA leading to higher economic growth. The economic 
growth (which is badly needed for South Africa) is closely tied to higher employment. 
, 
Therefore, " higher employment, better basic services and widespread shareholding 
of privatised parastatals leads to reduced inequality. This reduction in inequality, 
combined with better basic services, higher employment and full valuation of 
privatised shares, helps to ensure the legitimacy of privatisation" (Hartnett, 1997: 11-
12). 
5.1 How to Privatise SAA 
There are many different ways or styles of privatisation, such as auctions, private 
placement, mass privatisation, management buyouts and strategic partnerships. It is 
also important to consider what sort of ownership will be created, such as percentage 
owned by foreigners and citizens. Therefore, depending on the complexity of the 
service that have been undertaken by the state and its objectives a broad range of 
methods must be employed. In this paper only strategic partnerships and management 
buyout will be discussed as they seem more appropriate to be used for SAA' s 
privatisation, even though other methods might already have been used, for example, 
auction of Sun Air. 
2 W.J Hartnett, "Shares for All : Option for Distributing Wealth through Privatisation" Centre for Policy 
Studies, 1997 
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5.1.1 Strategic Partnership 
Strategic partnership involves negotiations to exchange a minority stake in an 
enterprise for some combination of cash proceeds, capitalisation, or further 
commitments such as new technology or an infusion of innovative management 
practises. Airline business is a complex venture in terms of technology used, safety 
procedures and this would involve huge capital layout at the start of the business. A 
new competitor in a market is normally expected to break even after four years or less 
if they are more efficient and has lots of expertise. The advantage of this method is 
that only those who have the expertise in this business, or those who will be able to 
contribute management talent and have the ability to innovate and be in line with 
market changes will be considered. Being in contact with potential partners of SAA 
by negotiations, very crucial decisions maybe reached which could boost the 
prospects of SAA. For example, some might have intellectual property such as 
patents, software or trade secrets. Some might even have access to markets SAA only 
dreamed about or capital. All these are important in improving SAA' s efficiency. 
Strategic partnership can also advance investment. This is with the notion that it is the 
mechanism which motivates the investment of capital or other resources in exchange 
for a stake in an enterprise3. Another way of looking at this might be through 
confidence instilled in the business community. For example, if people had more 
confidence in the operations of Virgin Atlantic Airlines, and they get a stake in SAA, 
people will now start looking at SAA with confidence because of Virgin' s reputation. 
This will lead to people eventually wanting to hold more shares of SAA once it is in 
the capital market and thus providing more funds for investment. 
Another advantage of strategic partnership is that, since it involves negotiations, lots 
of items can be brought under negotiation, such as improvement of basic services and 
3 W.J Hartnett, "Shares for All : Options for Distributing Wealth through Privatisation" Centre for 
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safety. Authorities would not want to get rid of SAA just for the sake of it, but it has 
to see to it that after that, basic services and safety are not compromised in anyway. It 
is also important to bear in mind that "the implicit price of items included in strategic 
partnerships should not exceed the price they could be bought for on the open 
market" (Hartnett, 1997:22) 
The strategic partnership is also advantageous because it is more of a gradual 
approach as opposed to mass privatisation, where everything must be sold under 
legislation. The gradual approach has the advantage of the state being able to woo the 
support of the labour force and thus confrontations can be avoided. This alone saves 
the state lots of money which could be lost through clashes with the labour force. 
Gradualism also leaves some element of hope in all the parties concerned that the 
whole process might be reversed if it does not work. 
From the discussions above it clearly gives foreign investors an edge over domestic 
investors to get a majority stake in SAA. It is normally anticipated that giving control 
to a foreign company would improve the value of the privatised firm. The domestic 
citizens who own minority stakes in the same firm can then free-ride on such 
improvements. However, foreign control of domestic firms may also impose costs on 
domestic shareholders, since the foreign majority shareholders may have objectives 
other than maximising the firm' s value. This may be to try to obtain large private 
benefits of control which cannot be shared by domestic shareholders, such as having 
enormous market power. As an example, a foreign firm may acquire majority shares 
in a firm not because they believe that the firm has great potential value, but only to 
get early entry into that market, which would have been closed for them. In the 
extreme case, a foreign firm may first buy a potential future competitor just to close it 
down. These problems usually plough some mixed feelings in the process of 
privatisation as to who should have control of the firms concerned ( that is, foreigners 
or citizens) The strategic partnership ' s negotiation process makes it a better choice as 
it offers a better chance to address these problems as the buyer may be asked to 
Policy Studies, 1997 
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commit to a certain level of investment. 
5.1.2 Management Buyout 
This method involves the management or employees of SAA purchasing minority 
stakes in SAA. This can be done through negotiations or legislation, for cash proceeds 
involving deep concessionary prices and payment terms4. 
The drawback of this method is that, it is likely to have a negative impact on 
corporate governance. The issue is that, SAA might be inefficient due to 
underperforming management or inefficient labour practices which needs to be 
overhauled by an outsider. Therefore, selling to the employees would not be doing 
any favour to the efficiency levels in SAA. However, one might argue that, ongoing 
incentives such as profit sharing or performance related bonuses of SAA shares, 
might help motivate employees to increase the value of SAA and thus SAA remaining 
efficient. 
Management buyout strategy also impairs liquidity in that equity stakes are "locked" 
in insider hands and are private deals. Outsiders would have no chance of getting 
stakes in SAA and thus the liquidity would remain low. This strategy also has a 
negative effect on investment as it sequesters away a stake on concessionary terms 
and thus has a generally negative effect on corporate governance and efficiency5. 
Another weakness of this strategy is that it might not be able to improve basic 
services. Basically if the same employees are not efficient, there is no way they can be 
4 W.J Hartnett, "Shares for All : Options for Distributing Wealth through Privatisation", Centre for 
Policy Studies, 1997 
5 W.J Hartnett, "Shares for All: Options for Distributing Wealth through Privatisation" Centre for 
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expected to improve the service they provide. 
Comparing the two strategies, it can also be seen that strategic partnership is better in 
many ways. It can also lead to increased economic growth, that is, if stake holders 
inject complementary value into SAA on positive terms. As already mentioned 
economic growth will trickle down to increased employment and decreased 
inequality. 
5.3 Overseas Experience 
Although airline deregulation elsewhere has been mentioned before in the paper, it 
has been the order of the day long time back in some countries. In the United States, 
the Airline Deregulation Act was passed in 1978. This allowed the industry to 
undergo some considerable changes as competition became the base upon which 
developments took place. The airline industry executive were afforded more freedom, 
to make their own business decisions which provided them with the opportunity to be 
more efficient and competitive. The results of this was that a dramatic increase of 
about 80% in airline productivity took place. Lots of government money was saved, 
with previously subsidised carriers being replaced by carriers operating smaller and 
better suited equipment. 
New carriers entered the market, and innovative fare policies were offered and 
competition was now based on costs and service levels. It was also found that the 
destructive competition argument proved to be false as fare wars were short-lived and 
that fears of monopoly power resulting from big carriers remaining alone in the 
market were unsubstantiated. Therefore, one can say that the United States ' 
deregulatory aviation policies have exerci~ed significant demonstration effects on 
Policy Studies, 1997 
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other countries. It is now left for the countries adopting the same policies to avoid the 
pitfalls the US might have encountered. It is however also important to bear in mind 
that even though the United State' s aviation deregulation policies achieved a great 
deal of cost reductions ( especially labour cost, through wage reductions), that might 
not be feasible in South Africa given the attitude of South African labour unions. 
The privatisation of British Airways (BA) also had impressive results. The process 
increased profits, and services improved. Employees also benefited as they acquired 
shares in the company for which they work. Based on the success of BA after 
privatisation, Malcolm Freeman, (BA manager in South Africa) once said that "in its 
parastatal days, BA was always ambitious in terms of seeking growth of traffic, fleet 
size, routes flown and other trappings of general aggrandisement. These days as a 
commercial concern, its primary objective is profitability. Now size certainly does not 
in itself offer guarantee of profit" ('Finance Week', 1992:24). In 1992 the Airline 
Business Survey showed BA having gained 5,8% in sales, putting it sixth on the top 
20 airlines sales surveyed and also becoming first when ranked in terms of highest 
profits ('Finance Week', 1992:3). 
Based on overseas success of deregulation and the previous arguments in favour of 
privatisation, it is clear that deregulation of airline business in South Africa has also 
been successful in bringing in competition and increased consumer choice. Normally 
privatisation would require foundations, or competition structures to be set before it is 
carried out. In South African airline business, the competition structure already exists. 
What still remains is for the state to pull out of the operations of SAA. If the state 
continues to be involved in the operations of SAA," it means the free competition 
market conditions are impaired and thus the state involvement ~ight eventually cause 
a market failure. The bottom line is that the reasons for state involvement in the 
operations of SAA is no longer valid. 
Having said that, privatisation of SAA is a common discussion point nowadays. The 
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authorities seem to be satisfied with the restructuring after deregulation thus far. They 
want to push ahead with at least a partial privatisation of SAA. British Airways, 
-
Virgin and Lufthansa are amongst the companies who have shown some interest in 
SAA. One thing that might delay the process of SAA being privatised is that all stake 
hofders should be consulted before the privatisation process can be implemented. The 
labour force reaction on privatisation is usually rebellious and this usually causes the 
state to lose lots of money. The labour unions are fond of pulling out of negotiations 
and it takes time for the- state to woo them back into the negotiations. There is no once 
off solution to this problem because the unions are usually well organised in South 
Africa. Negotiations thus seem to be the only way out. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6.0 Conclusion 
The contribution of the private sector in any economy is well recognised these days. 
The time has passed whereby the private sector was only given a passive or minor 
role in the economy. The involvement of the state in the market has had detrimental 
effects on the economy in most cases, especially when that involvement is not 
justified. 
Privatisation therefore, is basically trying to react to the need for the state to remove 
i~elf from the provision of some goods and services that could be efficiently provided 
by the private sector: The operations of the private sector is undermined by unfair 
competition by the state. This is when the state is doing the work or offering the 
services that private concerns are also doing or offering. Private enterprises are at a 
disadvantage when required or "forced" to compete directly with the state. This is 
-because the state owned enterprises are not subject to the same degree of duress to 
achieve an acceptable rate of return on investment and do not face the same threat of 
bankruptcy as does the private sector. Numerous studies have shown the advantages 
associated with the state leaving some of the provision for goods and services to the 
private sector. The state does not only ·save funds by doing this, but society as a whole 
benefits in that they would have a wide variety to choose from and at competitive 
prices. This stems mamly from the efficiency in corporate governance associated with 
the private sector as o posed to public enterprises. 
Studies also show that state owned enterprises responded positively to these 
adjustments mainly due to the creation of hard budget constraints and restrictions on 
credit for them, along with functioning markets, competition and bankruptcy laws 
(Brada, 1996). Thes~e introduced an indirect, yet effective form of corporate 
governance that usually lacks in the centrally planned economies. 
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Despite privatisation being slow in South Africa, there is still a huge scope for it. This 
is a route to encouraging greater foreign investment. Portfolio investors want small 
stakes in large quoted companies with quality assured. Venture capitalists look for 
high cash flow, minority stakes after privatisation, highly motivated managers and 
predictable governance. The Ministry of Public Enterprises regard privatisation as a 
process, which carries with it heavy responsibilities to the government and the people 
of South Africa. It must increase the number of stake holders and owners in the South 
African Economy, promote empowerment, enhance fair competitiveness, facilitate 
· growth and help to achieve the basic needs of the people and the objectives of the 
RDP. 
The deregulation of South African aviation is a huge step towards the increase in 
consumer welfare. The artificial monopoly in SAA which existed due to regulation of 
entry has ceased to exist. The advantages of this have been that, the consumers are 
benefiti1:1g from lower fares, better and efficient services, as well as various airlines to 
choose from. SAA in the past had been accused of misusing the states' funds, by 
charging unprofitable fares and operating unprofitable routes. Deregulation has 
nipped this behaviour in the bud, the result being that unprofitable routes were 
abandoned and pricing policies revised. The advantage of this is that a huge chunk of 
the government's money is now saved and can now be allocated to areas which need 
urgent attention in terms of development such as rural development. 
The experience elsewhere remains an important guide for South African policy 
makers to nurture their privatisation and react against some of the difficulties 
encountered elsewhere. South Africa has hi-gh prospects of succeeding in its 
endeavour to privatise SAA if some European countries could manage to do it amid 
substantial inter-modal competition, sucp as high speed trains which att!acted air 
passengers. 
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Another support for South Africa to forge ahead with privatisation of SAA comes 
from the US experience which involved a noticeable welfare improvement if 
measured by Kaldor compensation criteria. Overall losers were more than offset by 
those who benefited in terms of low fares, more flight choices and safety standards 
not being compromised. In using experience elsewhere South Africa can restrain 
merger activities which might lead to market dominance, especially if huge airlines 
are involved. 
The main lesson from this paper is that SAA has put into place measures that could be 
expected of a profit maximising firm. There is no doubt that these measures are also 
consistent with the aim of improved corporate governance. The statistical regression 
analysis reveals that SAA still has a lot to improve on its efficiency, and this could 
also be one reason why it is still struggling to show consistent performance in terms 
of profits. 
It can also be argued that the poor performance is due to the autonomy of SAA being 
hampered by its being a division of Transnet (which also has to report to the state). 
This makes SAA unable to structure its balance sheet to suit its own requirements. 
The commercialisation policy states Jhat cross-subsidisation be done away with, but 
the way the SAA records are reported, it is impossible to determine whether this is 
still practised. The government is not supposed to guarantee loans for SAA under 
commercialisation policy, however, there is still an element of this not being fulfilled 
due to the continuing association of SAA and Transnet. Despite all these being 
constraints of SAA to take full responsibility for results required of it, it also reveals 
some hidden anticompetitive measures that are imposed on the market. 
Although the commercialisation or deregulation of SAA has brought about changes 
required for a commercial concern, there are still some contentious issues relating to 
the state ' s involvement through Transnet in SAA and thus the state's competition 
against private airlines. Therefore, commercialisation alone is not enough. These 
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issues can be resolved if SAA is privatised. 
Chapter One of this paper started by giving a general overview of privatisation. The 
privatisation process is seen as moving from a plan to a market economy. Conditions 
which led to the state becoming the sole or major provider of the goods and services 
are discussed. It is also shown why the government can no longer ignore the 
importance of the private sector. Th~ economy and the society would be better off if 
the state only takes the provision of goods and services which only one firm can 
provide (natural monopoly). 
Chapter two deals with the economics of the airline business. It discusses why airline 
business was initially regulated, which seem to be a universal practise (not only by 
South Africa). The chapter also discusses the historical background of aviation in 
South Africa. Airline business is not a natural monopoly, thus the monopolistic 
advantage that resulted in SAA was mainly due to the regulation system. 
Chapter three, discusses the performance of SAA before and after deregulation. It is 
shown that the monopolistic advantage of SAA ceased to exist after deregulation. 
SAA changed its operation strategy in order to be competitive as competition became 
intense. The ultimate beneficiary is the consumer who now enjoys better service and a 
wide choice of airlines. Fears normally advanced for the need to regulate airline 
business as revealed in chapter two, were never experienced in South Africa. The 
price wars were never significant and were short lived. This chapter also argues that, 
even though SAA has been inconsistent in its financial results, the deregulation has 
restructured the airline to the extent that it is ready for privatisation. 
Chapter four covers a test of capacity utilisation using load factors . This failed to 
show that capacity utilisation has improved. From this test it can only be said that a 
lot still needs to be done at SAA to improve its capacity utilisation 
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Chapter five, discusses proposals or methods that could be used to privatise SAA. The 
argument is that the state' s presence in the operations of SAA at this point in time is 
unjustified. The only impact the state can have in the airline business is the erosion of 
the benefits already brought by deregulation. This would be due to government 
failure, as the state fails to level the playing field. SAA has to compete with other 
airlines in the market on the same footing . 
Thus SAA needs to be privatised. The best way to do this is argued to be the strategic 
partnership method. Now it only remains to be seen how far the South African policy 
makers can be able to use experience of other countries to get it right in SAA's 
privatisation. Having said that, there has been a point which caused some concern in 
this research. The lack of data or the way SAA continues to keep its records leaves 
little or no leeway for a better quantitative analysis, especially where costs are 
concerned. Numerous researches on privatisation in South Africa have been done on 
other sectors, for example, Telkom and Escom and if the problem of records keeping 
at SAA is sorted out, more research is likely to come from this sector. 
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